The Army and Coups in the Third World: The Case of Afghanistan

By: Dr. Phil. Najibullah Anwar, M.A.

Abstract

This article examines the role of the military in political life and the occurrence of coups in Third World countries, with a particular focus on Afghanistan. The study argues that weak democratic institutions, Cold War geopolitics, and the privileged position of the military within the state structure contributed to repeated coups and prolonged instability. Afghanistan provides a striking case study of how a military-dominated system facilitated coups in 1973 and 1978, ushering in decades of war and social upheaval.

Introduction

Coups d’état became a frequent phenomenon in the Third World following the Second World War, particularly during the Cold War period from 1950 to 1991. The rapid decolonization of Asia, Africa, and Latin America produced many newly independent states, but most lacked strong political and economic institutions. In this vacuum, the military often perceived itself as the most organized and powerful institution, capable of assuming political authority.

The rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union further intensified these dynamics. Both superpowers actively intervened in the internal politics of developing countries, supporting coups or counter-coups to expand their spheres of influence. Notable examples include Iran in 1953, Egypt in 1952, Chile in 1973, Pakistan in 1958, 1977, and 1999, and Nigeria throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Afghanistan, with its weak institutions and militarized governance, was no exception.

The Afghan Context

The majority of the Afghan population regarded the 1973 coup, which overthrew King Zahir Shah, as the beginning of misfortune for the nation. This event marked the onset of nearly fifty years of conflict, mass migration, and the deaths of millions of Afghans. Afghanistan soon became entangled in the geopolitics of the Cold War and was unable to escape its devastating consequences.

In Afghanistan, the military occupied a dominant position in politics, the economy, and social life. This was largely due to the weakness of democratic institutions and the fact that many high-ranking officers were members of the royal family, which also controlled key political positions.

During the 1950s and 1960s, Afghanistan’s military expenditure was relatively modest, averaging about 2%–3% of GDP—considerably lower than that of neighboring states. In 1960, the national budget was approximately 5 billion Afghanis (around $630 million), of which 400–500 million Afghanis ($50–60 million) were allocated to defense. At the time, the Afghan army numbered between 90,000 and 100,000 personnel, though it was only modestly equipped. Both the Soviet Union and the United States provided military supplies under the broader dynamics of Cold War competition.

King Zahir Shah was reluctant to expand military spending, preferring instead to prioritize infrastructure and education, financed primarily through international aid. Nonetheless, the Ministry of Defense remained the strongest institution in government. The Minister of Defense was not required to attend cabinet meetings, and military matters were excluded from cabinet deliberations. Defense ministers reported directly to the king, bypassing the authority of the prime minister.

The Roots of the Coups

One critical factor that facilitated coups in Afghanistan was the exclusive control of the Ministry of Defense by military officers. No civilian ever held this position. From 1963 until the 1973 coup, General Khan Mohammad Khan served as Minister of Defense. Military dominance extended beyond the ministry itself: many provincial command posts and even departments within the Ministry of Interior were headed by army officers, a situation regularly criticized by civilian officials. This demonstrated the pervasive influence of the armed forces in Afghan governance.

Although the overall defense budget was small compared to neighboring states, high-ranking military officials enjoyed significant privileges. In contrast, lower-ranking officers and ordinary soldiers received minimal benefits. This internal imbalance created dissatisfaction within the ranks and contributed to divisions that were later exploited during the coups.

Historically, Afghanistan’s decisive victories against foreign powers were achieved not by the army but by the Afghan people themselves, through widespread resistance movements. The army, by contrast, served primarily as an instrument of the state rather than of the nation.

The Coups of 1973 and 1978

The coups of 1973 and 1978 in Afghanistan succeeded not because the military failed to suppress them but because the military itself was the principal actor behind them. Other state institutions—parliament, the courts, and the police—were too weak to mount any resistance. Once officers leading the coups secured control of key sites such as television and radio stations, airports, and the royal or presidential palace, the remainder of the army either joined the coup or remained passive.

The 1973 coup, led by Mohammed Daoud Khan, replaced the monarchy with a republic but did not resolve Afghanistan’s institutional weaknesses. Instead, it deepened political instability, setting the stage for the 1978 coup by the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). The latter coup drew the country even further into Cold War rivalries, ultimately leading to foreign intervention, prolonged conflict, and national tragedy.

Conclusion

The Afghan case illustrates the central role of the military in facilitating coups in the Third World. Weak democratic institutions, the privileged position of military elites, and the influence of Cold War geopolitics combined to make coups both possible and successful. While Afghanistan’s military budget and capacity were limited, its institutional dominance ensured that it was the decisive actor in moments of political crisis.

The coups of 1973 and 1978 marked turning points in Afghanistan’s modern history. They not only undermined prospects for stable governance but also exposed the country to the destructive currents of international rivalry. The legacy of these coups continues to shape Afghanistan’s political and social landscape today.