National Interest vs. Religious Sentiment: A Critical Review of Afghanistan’s Foreign Policy Regarding the Durand Line
By: Dr. Phil. Najibullah Anwar, Phil.M.A.
Pakistan has never pursued a foreign policy toward Afghanistan grounded in goodwill or constructive engagement. Consequently, those who argue that “recognizing the Durand Line will transform Pakistan’s hostile behavior” rely on an assumption lacking empirical, historical, or political justification. Even if the Afghan state and people were to accept this line as the official international border, no credible guarantee exists that Pakistan would subsequently adopt a cooperative or friendly neighborhood policy. Indeed, Pakistan’s strategic objectives extend far beyond the mere recognition of the Line, and there remains a tangible possibility that further territorial claims—such as on Afghanistan’s eastern provinces, including Kunar—could emerge. In more pessimistic scenarios, even Kabul, and eventually Afghanistan’s northern and western regions, could become subjects of future claims.
A small group—often holding positions shaped by antagonism toward the Pashtun community—contends that revoking the Durand Line would enhance the political weight of Pashtuns and consequently diminish the political standing of Tajiks. However, Afghanistan’s political history demonstrates that national governance and decision-making have never been based on ethnicity, race, or language. Moreover, whenever Afghan territory expanded historically, ethnic minorities enjoyed extensive social, cultural, and political freedoms and were never subjected to systemic marginalization.
Despite longstanding tensions, Afghanistan never went to war with Pakistan over the Durand Line after Pakistan’s creation. Earlier Afghan governments justified this restraint by asserting that “we are a Muslim nation and do not wage war against our Muslim brothers.” This approach represented a significant flaw in Afghanistan’s foreign policy, because foreign policy must be rooted in national interests rather than religious sentiments. For instance, during the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, Afghanistan adopted a position of strict neutrality—despite the opportunities available to advance its national interests. Similarly, in the various wars between Pakistan and India, Afghanistan again remained neutral and framed its policies through religious rather than strategic considerations. The consequences of such decisions are evident today in the unresolved status of the Durand Line.
In contrast, other Muslim-majority states formulate foreign policy based on national interests rather than religious affinities. For example, Iran recognized the State of Israel in 1948/1949 and maintained close political, economic, and intelligence cooperation with Israel until 1979. Iran’s motivations were rooted not in religious considerations but in geopolitical realities and its strained relations with several Arab states. Likewise, the Iran–Iraq War after Ayatollah Khomeini’s rise to power demonstrated that even revolutionary Islamic governments make strategic decisions grounded in national interests rather than purely religious doctrine.
Historically, the Durand Agreement was temporary in nature. Amir Abdur Rahman Khan explicitly stated in his memoirs that he accepted the agreement only as a provisional arrangement, as his primary objective was the consolidation of authority within the territories under his direct control. He intended to revisit the status of the lands beyond the Line once his rule was firmly secured. For this reason, after his death the agreement was renewed once under Amir Habibullah Khan and again during the reign of his grandson. Had the Durand Line been intended as a permanent international border, no such renewals would have been necessary. Furthermore, after the fall of the Afghan monarchy, no further extensions occurred, underscoring the agreement’s uncertain and non-permanent legal character.
From the standpoint of international law, the Durand Agreement also lacks strong legal validity. It was concluded between the British colonial government and an Afghan state that was under British suzerainty and thus lacked full sovereignty in its foreign policy decisions. Agreements concluded under such conditions cannot be regarded as permanently binding. Additionally, the Durand Agreement itself was framed as a temporary arrangement rather than a definitive boundary settlement.
Two predominant practices existed in international politics at the time:
1. Exterritorial Acquisition – the permanent transfer or sale of territory from one state to another (e.g., the purchase of Alaska in 1867 or Louisiana in 1803).
2. Territorial Leasing – the temporary transfer of territorial control in exchange for financial, military, or political concessions, which was the approach applied in Anglo–Afghan relations.
Examples such as the Kowloon lease and the Hong Kong arrangements reflected similar frameworks of temporary territorial administration.
Despite the gravity of the Durand issue, Afghan governments failed to develop a coherent, sustained, or unified border policy. Practical efforts rarely went beyond establishing “Radio Pashtunistan,” which broadcast sporadic propaganda against Pakistan—an initiative that lacked consistency, strategic depth, and measurable impact. Deep divisions among Afghan leaders regarding Pashtunistan and Balochistan, combined with the absence of a comprehensive national framework, prevented the issue from being addressed systematically or over the long term.
This fragmented approach persisted until Mohammad Daoud Khan came to power. He was the first Afghan leader to pursue an active, coherent, and realistic policy concerning the Durand issue. In the early years of his presidency, Abdul Rahman Pazhwak—one of Afghanistan’s most distinguished diplomats and foreign policy theorists—proposed two significant strategic initiatives. Despite their importance, neither was implemented.
1. First Proposal
To include explicitly in the preamble of the Afghan Constitution that Afghanistan is a country whose territory and nation were subjected to externally imposed division. This constitutional recognition would affirm that Afghanistan does not relinquish its historical rights; however, given domestic conditions and international realities, the state would defer the practical pursuit of its claims to an appropriate future time and commit to resolving the matter exclusively through peaceful means. Pazhwak supported this approach by referencing examples such as Germany, Korea, and China, all of which incorporated territorial division into their constitutional frameworks.
2. Second Proposal
To systematically inform international organizations—through formal diplomatic notes and official declarations—of Afghanistan’s legitimate historical claims and its principled position on the Durand Line. These communications would emphasize that Afghanistan does not renounce its rights, even though it postpones practical action in the interest of regional and global stability. Had these peaceful and diplomatic measures been adopted by earlier Afghan governments, Pakistan would have been discouraged from advancing further territorial claims, and Afghanistan would have secured international acknowledgment that the issue would be addressed strictly through peaceful channels.
