Lethargy in Afghan foreign policy: Causes and consequences
By: Dr. Najibullah Anwar
This is not the first time that a war has occurred between the countries of India and Pakistan; previously, there have been three wars between these two countries. However, the difference this time is that both countries possess nuclear power.
After the British left the Indian subcontinent, two new countries—India and Pakistan—were created based on the Two-Nation Theory. Since their independence in 1947, these countries have fought four major wars: in 1947–48, 1965, 1971, and the 1999 Kargil War. The first war (1947–48) was over the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, and the later conflicts were also rooted in territorial disputes and ongoing political tensions.
Pakistan applied for membership in the United Nations in 1947 as a new state, not as the successor to British India. India, on the other hand, was recognized as the legal successor state to British India and retained its UN seat, which it had held since 1945.
The Afghan government missed a major opportunity to address the issue—especially through military means—at a time when the British were preparing to leave the region and were unwilling to escalate tensions. Afghan General Mohammad Omar Abawai had recommended that Afghan leaders support the tribes and people across the border, as the situation was vague and anarchic.
“The general asserted that the issue could be resolved through a peaceful and bloodless solution.”
Throughout these wars, Afghanistan maintained a neutral stance, often stating that since Pakistan is a fellow Muslim country, Afghanistan did not want to be involved in a war against it.
The 1971 war was particularly significant. It resulted in the secession of East Pakistan and the creation of a new state in the region—Bangladesh. Pakistan faced a severe defeat, with more than 90,000 West Pakistani troops surrendering in East Pakistan. India played a major role in this conflict and achieved a decisive victory, as it also did during the 1999 Kargil War. In contrast, the wars of 1947–48 and 1965 ended in stalemate, with no clear winner.
Unfortunately, in past wars, Afghanistan has taken a neutral stance and declared that Pakistan is an Islamic country, and we do not want to harm a fellow Muslim country. Afghan leaders lacked a firm understanding of the country’s territorial losses and disputed borders with its neighbors. During the reign of King Amanullah, people from across the Durand Line approached the king loo, asking for help in resisting the enforcement of the Durand Line. However, the king refused their request and sent them back.
After the emergence of the new state of Pakistan, Afghanistan failed to take a clear position toward it. Initially, Afghanistan did not recognize Pakistan as a sovereign state. However, under the mediation and advice of other Muslim countries, Afghanistan eventually changed its stance and officially recognized Pakistan. After the formation of Pakistan, the Afghan government convened a national grand assembly (Loya Jirga) in 1949, calling upon senior and notable figures. The Loya Jirga declared the Durand Line an illegitimate border, stating that it had been withdrawn without Afghanistan’s consent.
Later, in the 1960s, a radio program targeting Pashtuns across the Durand Line was launched by Afghan state radio, which was under government control. As long as relations with Pakistan remained good, no propaganda was aired against it. However, when relations deteriorated, anti-Pakistan propaganda increased. One example was the frequent broadcasting of the patriotic hymn “Da Pashtunistan Zma Da” (“This Pashtunistan is Ours”)—played multiple times a day during periods of tension.
Afghan leaders lacked a coherent strategy to resolve the issue or confront Pakistan effectively. At times, they called for the reintegration of lost territories into Afghanistan; at other times, they advocated for the creation of an independent Pashtun state, or supported the idea of self-determination.
Regarding Balochistan, Afghan officials did not clearly define their stance—whether to include it under the Pashtunistan policy or treat it as a separate matter. There was also no clear consensus on the size of the claimed territory. For example, the territorial demands made by President Daoud Khan differed significantly from those suggested by Shah Mahmud Khan. “It appears that Afghan leaders repeatedly missed opportunities to resolve the issue, suggesting that they may not have genuinely sought a solution and were instead content to accept the status quo.”
